Heterogeneity and Trade Dispute Comparing U.S.-Japan Trade Friction and U.S.-China Trade and Technological Rivalry

Fang Zhou

doi:10.71113/JCSIS.v2i3.180

Authors

Fang Zhou Waseda University, Japan

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.71113/JCSIS.v2i3.180

Keywords:

U.S.-Japan trade friction, Sino-U.S. trade war, heterogeneity, trade friction, Rising power, Industry competition

Abstract

This study conducts a comparative analysis of two major trade conflicts-the U.S.-Japan trade friction of the 1980s and the current U.S.-China trade war- to explore the critical role of heterogeneity in shaping these conflicts. The study posits that heterogeneity cannot be assimilated or eliminated because countries, as countries like China and Japan inherently develop models different from that of the United States. Moreover, heterogeneity is closely related to state power; when power levels between states converge, heterogeneity is often seen as a potential threat.However, this study also points out that similarities in political institutions and ideologies can help mitigate the scope and intensity of conflicts. In the case of the U.S.-Japan dispute, most of the conflict has been contained between the two countries through targeted bilateral negotiations and industry-specific agreements. In contrast, the -China economic game poses a more far-reaching challenge to the existing international order. While China's economic rise has followed certain similar path to Japan's, its unique political system and ideological differences have made the impact of this conflict more pronounced.

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